The problem of reconciling the frequentist and Bayesian evidence in testing statistical hypotheses has been extensively studied in the literature. Most of the existing work considers cases without the nuisance parameters which is not the frequently encountered situation since the presence of the nuisance parameters is very common in practice. In this paper, we consider the reconcilability of the Bayesian evidence against the null hypothesis 0 in terms of the posterior probability of 0 being true and the frequentist evidence against 0 in terms of the P value in testing normal means where the nuisance parameters are present. The reconcilability of evidence can be obtained both for testing a normal mean and for the Behrens-Fisher problem.
Introduction
In the problem of testing a statistical hypothesis 0 , a frequentist may give evidence against 0 by the observed significance level, the value, while a Bayesian may give it by the posterior probability that 0 is true. Lindley [1] illustrated the possible discrepancy between the Bayesian and the frequentist evidence. The relationship of these two measures of evidence is then extensively studied in the literature. Pratt [2] revealed that the values are usually approximately equal to the posterior probabilities in the onesided testing problems. Casella and Berger [3] considered testing the one-sided hypothesis for a location parameter and showed that the lower bounds of the posterior probability over some reasonable classes of priors are exactly equal to the corresponding values in many cases. Some important papers which deal with the reconcilability of the Bayesian and frequentist evidence are Bartlett [4] , Cox [5] , Shafer [6] , Berger and Delampady [7] , and Berger and Sellke [8] .
Although many researches have been carried out to deal with the problem of reconciling the Bayesian and frequentist evidence and some of them show that evidence is reconcilable in several specific situations, most of the existing work assumes that no other unknown parameters are present except the parameters of interest. In fact, we may be confronted with the nuisance parameters in various situations. In the location-scale settings, for example, when the location parameter is unknown, so is the scale parameter, in general.
However, in significance testing of hypotheses with the nuisance parameters, the classical values are typically not available. Tsui and Weerahandi [9] , considering testing the one-sided hypothesis of the form
where is the parameter of interest and is a fixed constant, introduced the concept of the generalized value, which appears to be useful in situations where conventional frequentist approaches do not provide useful solutions. Tsui and Weerahandi [9] and some later relevant works formulated the generalized values for many specific examples. Hannig et al. [10] provided a general method for constructing the generalized value via fiducial inference.
In this paper, for the one-sided testing situations about normal means where the nuisance parameters are present, we study the reconcilability of the Bayesian evidence and
Therefore, we can give the posterior density for ( , 2 ) as
Then the marginal posterior density for can be obtained by integrating out 2 as
from which we know that
Consequently, the posterior probability of 0 being true is
where ] is a -variable with ] degrees of freedom. Notice that if 0 = , we have Proof. Suppose that is a nonpositive random variable obtained by the negative part of ; that is, the density of is
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Then the density of = /√ is
By Theorem 3.3.2 in Lehmann [11] , for any fixed nonpositive constant , we have that ( ≤ ) is nonincreasing in since it can be verified that the family of densities ( , ) has monotone likelihood ratio in . This implies that Lemma 1 holds for the case when ≤ 0 since ( ≤ ) = ( ≤ )/2.
Since when > 0, we have ( ≤ ) = 1/2 + (0 ≤ ≤ ), the proof for the latter case is completely analogous if we introduce a nonnegative random variable obtained by the positive part of .
Then comparing (3) and (10), for 0 = and any fixed nonnegative ] 0 , we have
which implies that
The reconcilability of the Bayesian and frequentist evidence is therefore obtained in this testing problem. We summarize this as the following theorem. 
Behrens-Fisher
Problem. Now we turn to consider the Behrens-Fisher problem. It is a classical testing situation in which the nuisance parameters are present and no useful pivotal quantities are available. Suppose that 1 , . . . , and 1 , . . . , are two independent random samples from two normal populations ( 1 , are completely unspecified. We are interested in testing the hypothesis of the form
where is a fixed constant. In situations where the traditional frequentist approaches fail to provide useful solutions, the conception of the generalized values introduced by Tsui and Weerahandi [9] appears to be helpful in deriving the frequentist evidence for testing a statistical hypothesis. For this specific problem of testing hypothesis (16), we can give the generalized value as
where
In this problem, we consider the reconcilability of evidence under the following conjugate class of prior distributions 
2 ) .
Under 2 , the posterior density of
Then the posterior density of ( , 2 , 
So that the posterior probability of 0 is
It is straightforward to check that lim 01 , 02 , 01 , 02 → 0
where and are the observation of the sample mean and , respectively, 
Proof. Let
(27) (I) We first prove that, given 2 , as is sufficiently large, we have
In fact, for any > 0, as is sufficiently large,
where ( , ) = (] 02 +2) 
That is,
Similarly, as → +∞, we have
Therefore, we have
Consequently, we have
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where Φ(⋅) stands for the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution and the last equation is due to the fact that and are independent normal distributions. Similarly, for (24), we have lim 01 , 02 , 01 , 02 → 0
Note that for each ( , ) in (−∞, 0), Φ( ( , )/ ) is increasing in ∈ (0, ∞). Therefore, by (35), we have
In addition, by the symmetry of the -distribution, it follows that ( , ) < 0 is equivalent to ( ) < 1/2. Therefore, by (36), (37), and (39), the conclusion of Theorem 3 holds.
The following theorem shows that, even for fixed and with 2 < , < ∞, we still obtain the reconcilability of the frequentist and Bayesian evidence.
Theorem 4.
As min{] 01 , ] 02 } → ∞, the conclusion of Theorem 3 holds for any fixed and with 2 < , < ∞; that is,
Proof. We still adopt the notations of Theorem 3. We first prove that, as ] 02 → ∞,
By the proof of Theorem 3, we have 
Let ( ) denote the density function of 2 . Then it is easy to see that ( ) reaches the maximum at = − 2 and that max ( ) = ( − 2) → 0, as → ∞. Therefore, as ] 02 is sufficiently large, it holds that On the other hand, for any fixed (2 < < ∞) and ̸ = 0, we have
for some 0 > 0. Therefore, as ] 02 → ∞, by (46) and (47), we have (̃1 < ) − ( 1 < ) > 0. Furthermore, by (45), we have The Scientific World Journal That is,
Similarly, for any fixed (2 < < ∞), as ] 01 → ∞, we have
Therefore, similar to Theorem 3, as min{] 01 , ] 02 } → ∞, for any fixed and with 2 < , < ∞, we have
The rest part of the proof is similar to that of (II) of Theorem 3. Table 2 .
Conclusions
In the presence of the nuisance parameters, we study the reconcilability of the value and the Bayesian evidence in the one-sided hypothesis testing problem about normal means. This provides another illustration of testing situation where the Bayesian and frequentist evidence can be reconciled and may therefore to some extent prevent people from debasing or even dismissing values as evidence in hypothesis testing problems. Furthermore, our results of the reconcilability in the one-sided testing situations may help us to come to the idea that maybe it is arbitrary to assert the irreconcilability of the evidence in the two-sided (point or interval) hypothesis testing problems and perhaps we should be concerned more about the appropriateness of the methods we employ to tackle a two-sided hypothesis in both the frequentist and the Bayesian frameworks.
